Begun on February 24, 2022, the war in Ukraine is taking place both on the ground and in cyberspace. Ksenia Ermoshina is a research fellow at the CNRS Internet and Society Center. His work is at the crossroads of several disciplines, mixing political science and computer science. She analyzes communication infrastructures and more specifically how the occupation of a territory can influence communication methods. She has worked more specifically on the case of Ukraine since the start of the Crimean War in 2014.
Sciences et Avenir: What light can your work on Crimea shed on the war in Ukraine in 2022?
Ksenia Ermoshina: Crimea was taken by the Russians many years ago. In this, it is a kind of outpost to see what could happen in Ukraine if the country loses the war against Russia. In Crimea, the press left the peninsula in 2015, at the same time as political opponents. The latter are concerned by the fact that Crimea has been abandoned by Ukraine and some continue to go there to cover certain events on a “freelance” basis. Otherwise, the territory would live behind closed doors. The 111 operators listed in 2018 all went through Miranda Media, a subsidiary of Rostelecom, a Russian telecommunications company. This means that people no longer have access to information as before, that many sites are blocked. They therefore perceive an image of the situation as broadcast by Russia. Fleeing journalists and activists know Russian ways and seek to prepare Ukraine. They are currently very active and have been joined by Anonymous (a movement of hacktivists posing as defenders of freedom of expression, editor’s note). In addition, about 150,000 Russian technicians have left the country and some are now working on the Ukrainian side doing IT volunteer work with NGOs. The forces are very diverse now.
In parallel with the progress of the war on a territory, what tools do you use to observe cyberspace?
I use what is called my network metrology. This discipline makes it possible to analyze Internet sites and find which ones are blocked. In Russia, for example, all sites that mention the word “war” are blocked. There are open databases, applications to detect blocked sites. We also observe Internet shutdowns, which makes it possible to judge the situation in a country.
How did the population find out about the situation?
By going to a forum in the city of Simferopol (in Crimea, editor’s note), I saw that a branch of gamers were among the first to sound the alarm, in July 2014, when the submarine cable entered the Ukraine and Russia has been activated.
Begun on February 24, 2022, the war in Ukraine is taking place both on the ground and in cyberspace. Ksenia Ermoshina is a research fellow at the CNRS Internet and Society Center. His work is at the crossroads of several disciplines, mixing political science and computer science. She analyzes communication infrastructures and more specifically how the occupation of a territory can influence communication methods. She has worked more specifically on the case of Ukraine since the start of the Crimean War in 2014.
Sciences et Avenir: What light can your work on Crimea shed on the war in Ukraine in 2022?
Ksenia Ermoshina: Crimea was taken by the Russians many years ago. In this, it is a kind of outpost to see what could happen in Ukraine if the country loses the war against Russia. In Crimea, the press left the peninsula in 2015, at the same time as political opponents. The latter are concerned by the fact that Crimea has been abandoned by Ukraine and some continue to go there to cover certain events on a “freelance” basis. Otherwise, the territory would live behind closed doors. The 111 operators listed in 2018 all went through Miranda Media, a subsidiary of Rostelecom, a Russian telecommunications company. This means that people no longer have access to information as before, that many sites are blocked. They therefore perceive an image of the situation as broadcast by Russia. Fleeing journalists and activists know Russian ways and seek to prepare Ukraine. They are currently very active and have been joined by Anonymous (a movement of hacktivists posing as defenders of freedom of expression, editor’s note). In addition, about 150,000 Russian technicians have left the country and some are now working on the Ukrainian side doing IT volunteer work with NGOs. The forces are very diverse now.
In parallel with the progress of the war on a territory, what tools do you use to observe cyberspace?
I use what is called my network metrology. This discipline makes it possible to analyze Internet sites and find which ones are blocked. In Russia, for example, all sites that mention the word “war” are blocked. There are open databases, applications to detect blocked sites. We also observe Internet shutdowns, which makes it possible to judge the situation in a country.
How did the population find out about the situation?
By going to a forum in the city of Simferopol (in Crimea, editor’s note), I saw that a branch of gamers were among the first to sound the alarm, in July 2014, when the submarine cable entered the Ukraine and Russia has been activated. These fans of the game World of Tanks (multiplayer online game dedicated to tank battles, editor’s note) noticed that the servers were much slower than usual and were unhappy. After some manipulation to see how the traffic was routed – a way to see the steps between his computer and the server we want to reach – they saw that the network passed through Russia. At the same time, some journalists accustomed to streaming video for their media noticed that the connection was degraded. The rural population, poorly connected, did not notice it until mass censorship reached Facebook or Instagram.
How can we continue to use the Internet freely in occupied territories?
To circumvent censorship, residents can always turn to the Darknet. The Torproject site is certainly blocked, but you can download the Tor search engine from other sites or have it sent to Telegram (secure messaging application, editor’s note). At the same time, a huge amount of work is being done to raise public awareness of the usefulness of VPNs (virtual private networks, which make it possible to isolate one’s exchanges from the rest of the traffic, editor’s note). In Crimea, local radio stations encouraged residents to download VPNs. They went so far as to write messages on billboards along the roads that lead from Ukraine to Crimea saying: “Install a VPN, you are entering a censorship zone.” We are also witnessing a return to the radio format. A journalist has launched a project on short waves, which he broadcasts at specific times of the day and night. This radio can be received as far away as Russia, at the level Journalists prefer not to write anything on voicemail, even when it is secured like Signal, for fear that their device will be seized and that the police will be able to read their communications. no notes, memorize everything, and then type their texts in the cloud, never directly on their computer.
How is the resistance organised?
There is only a minority of people who master all these technologies. The resistance is mainly based on Internet service providers (ISPs). There are 3,500 in Russia, some of whom do not do what they are asked to do. Some Ukrainian ISPs collaborate with those in Lugansk or Donyetsk. They form a friendly community, made up of peers who belonged to the same country in the past (Doniestk and Lugansk belonged to Ukraine before passing under the People’s Republic of Donestk, under Russian control, editor’s note). Russian surveillance on this territory is very opaque. We don’t know much about it.
Who is fighting today to protect Ukrainian cyberspace?
There are many Internet Service Providers, maybe 1,000. It is a tight-knit community that is found under the banner of the Ukrainian Confederation of Internet Operators. They share a Whatsapp group in an atmosphere of friendly competition. Since the start of the war, access providers have managed to ensure a connection to the bombarded territories: those who can repair damaged cables, even competitors’ cables, so that the people retain access to information. . They are united like soldiers at the front. The competition no longer exists, they are sharing. They lend each other meters and meters of optical cables and try to organize repairs with armored vehicles, because they do not hesitate to move under the bombs.
Are there also individual initiatives?
In areas that are not attacked, the quality of Internet connections remains very good. Indeed, Ukraine is connected to Frankfurt, where all the ISPs from all over the world meet. In some places, internet access is provided through Elon Musk’s Starlink (an Internet connection service thanks to a fleet of satellites in low orbit, which guarantees a connection in the places least well served by the fixed and mobile networks, editor’s note). It’s also very funny to see a pretty Ukrainian house in a village, often the local town hall, with a small sign in front that says “Here wifi Starlink” and users posted right next to it. Impossible to destroy these satellites, so Internet access is always guaranteed.
Some cities are completely disconnected, but there are still local initiatives, such as DCOMS, servers installed in major cities that allow users from the same city to communicate on the network, even without Internet access. It’s like the old-school LANs that geeks and gamers used to play together. This ensures a way to talk to each other, even when a city like kyiv is not connected to an outside network.